The Aft Protection Process Improvement Team (PIT) was chartered to evaluate Orbiter vehicle (OV) aft compartment processing in the horizontal and vertical positions. The team emphasized the prevention of damage to flight hardware during processing. Attention was focused on aft processing when a vacuum-jacketed line was damaged at a critical point in the processing flow. As a result, senior management chartered a team to evaluate opportunities to prevent flight hardware damage.

The Aft Protection PIT was an intensive effort that assembled a dedicated cross-functional team composed of individuals who are involved in the processing in the Orbiter aft compartment. The team utilized Continues Improvement (CI) tools to evaluate aft compartment processing areas of concern, including access, flight hardware damage, high-traffic areas, fall protection issues, revising the aft training video, and the one-time entry form. The PIT was empowered by management to seek solutions and rapidly implement changes. The team included trained facilitators from the United Space Alliance (USA) Industrial Engineering and Human Factors department and was led by team leaders from shop and engineering.

The team assessed and provided improvements for:

• Initial Aft Access (Post OV-105 STS 99 Roll-In) – Initial entry into the Orbiter aft compartment after roll-in was evaluated.
• Potential collateral damage to adjacent hardware/systems – The team evaluated when flight hardware damage was occurring during processing.
• First-Time Entry Forms – One-time entry forms did not require a briefing and escort.
• Aft Access Training Video (OV-211-LSC) – Training video was outdated and did not reflect the current vehicle configurations.
• Lighting – Improve lighting and evaluate the use of cordless lights to prevent collateral flight hardware damage caused by electrical cords.
• Communication box and headset cord concerns – Engineering Support Request (ESR) written to evaluate wireless headsets to prevent damage caused by communication cords and Operational Intercommunication System-Digital (OIS-D) boxes.
• Emergency Egress Procedures –Evaluation performed of man loading on each specific platform area; developed man-loading standard for the horizontal and vertical platform sets.
• Fall Protection issues inside the aft compartment – Aft platform evaluated to study difficult access areas and those that put the technicians in a working-at-heights issue.

Key accomplishments:

• March 2000: Developed an Operational and Maintenance Instruction (OMI) that provides the initial aft access sequence. Revised first-time entry forms to require a briefing by shop management and an escort for the visitor.
• June 2000: (Horizontal Operations) Wrote ESR to improve access to the power-head platforms and to eliminate fall protection issues. Developed mitigation plan to eliminate fall hazards for technicians during engine installation and removal. Conducted platform fit checks for all aft platforms.
• December 2001: Updated Aft Access Training Video to reflect the requirement changes with an emphasis on flight hardware protection and personnel safety.
• March 2002: Evaluated wireless headsets for use inside the vehicle to eliminate the communication cords, which are a potential source of damage to flight hardware.

Contacts: L.G. Thurow (Lori.Thurow-1@ksc.nasa.gov), YA-B, (321) 867-8810; and T.L. O’Brien, PH-M3-A, (321) 867-0407
Participating Organizations: United Space Alliance (J.D. Comer, J.G. Crews, J.R. Ewald, G.P. Floyd, T.G. Riley, D.L. Bilby, D.S. Mayer, W.M. McKenzie, J.L. Gerlach, J.J. Curtis, J.W. Garrett, and T.K. Amster), Rocketdyne (S.E. Keeler), and NASA PH